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It was held in Ratzlafv. United
States, 114 S.Ct. 655 (1994), that
the government must prove that the
defendant acted with knowledge of
the illegality of his conduct, when
engaged in the structuring of a
currency transaction for the pur-
poses of evading the reporting re-
quirement of domestic banks as
prohibited by 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a)
and 5324(3)(1993). In so holding,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, found that the
antistructuring statute, § 5324(3),
required (1) knowledge of a do-
mestic bank's obligation to file a
written report with the Secretary of
the Treasury for any cash transac-
tion exceeding $10,000.00; (2)
"structuring" a transaction, i.e.
the dividing of a single transaction
which exceeds the $10,000.00 re-
porting threshold into two or more
separate transactions, for the pur-
pose of evading the reporting re-
quirement; and that § 5322(a),
which establishes criminal penal-
ties, required (3) actual knowledge
that said structuring is illegal. Id.
at 656.
On October 20, 1988, the de-
fendant, Waldemar Ratzlaf, in-
curred a $160,000.00 gambling
debt while playing blackjack at the
High Sierra Casino in Reno, Ne-
vada. On October 27, 1988,
Ratzlaf returned to the casino with
$100,000.00 cash in a shopping
bag in order to pay off his debt. He
informed casino personnel that he
did not want any written reports
made reflecting his payment. The
casino vice president then told
Ratzlaf of his statutory require-
ment to report to state and federal
authorities any cash transaction
exceeding $10,000.00, but that a
cashier's check for the entire
amount could be accepted without
triggering the statute. The casino
furnished Ratzlaf with a limousine
to take him to the bank in order to
obtain a cashier's check. Bank
officials, however, informed
Ratzlaf that domestic banks were
under a similar obligation to report
any cash transactions exceeding
$10,000.00 to state and federal
authorities. As a result, Ratzlaf
proceeded to purchase cashier's
checks in denominations less than
$10,000.00 at different banks in
and around Stateline, Nevada, and
South Lake Tahoe, California.
Ratzlaf returned to the casino and
paid off $76,000.00 of his debt
and paid the balance off a few
weeks later with additional
cashier's checks in denominations
of less than $10,000.00.
At trial, ajury convicted Ratzlaf
of having knowledge of a bank's
reporting obligation and of struc-
turing currency transactions for
the purpose of circumventing the
reporting obligation of financial
institutions in violation of31 U.S.C.
§§ 5322(a) and 5324(3)(1993).
Ratzlaf was fined and sentenced to
prison. On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, the court affirmed the trial
judge's instructions to the jury,
which stated that the government
need only prove the defendant's
knowledge of the bank's duty to
report cash transactions in excess
of $10,000.00 and that the defen-
dant attempted to evade the report-
ing requirement. The court of ap-
peals ruled that the government did
not have to establish that the defen-
dant knew that the structuring in
which he was engaged was unlaw-
ful in order to give effect to the
"willfulness" requirement in §
5322(a). The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in
order to resolve the conflict sur-
rounding the meaning of the "will-
fulness" requirement in § 5322(a).
The Court began its analysis by
examining the congressional pur-
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pose for enacting the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act (Bank Secrecy Act) in 1970.
Id. at 658 (citations omitted).
Noting that the statute contained a
variety of reporting requirements
applicable to foreign and domestic
financial institutions, the Court
found that Congress passed the
Bank Secrecy Act in response to
increasing criminal activity, such
as money laundering and tax eva-
sion, and the use of financial insti-
tutions as a means to further such
criminal activity. Id. The Court
continued by stating that Congress
adopted an antistructuring provi-
sion, 31 U.S.C. § 5324, as part of
the Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986, in order to prevent
circumvention of reporting require-
ments of the Bank Secrecy Act. Id.
Section 5324 states in pertinent
part: "No person shall for the pur-
pose of evading the reporting
requirements of section 5313(a)
with respect to such transaction-
(3) structure or assist in structur-
ing, or attempt to structure or as-
sist in structuring, any transaction
with one or more domestic finan-
cial institutions."
Id. Section 5322(a) provides for
criminal penalties in the form of a
fine, notto exceed $250,000.00, or
imprisonment for not more than
five years, or both, to be imposed
upon "[a] person willfully violat-
ing" the antistructuring statute. Id.
at 658-659.
The Court next interpreted the
meaning of the "willfulness" re-
quirement found in § 5322(a). The
Court rejected the trial court's con-
clusion that the "willfulness" re-
quirement of § 5322(a) was satis-
fied by a finding that the defendant
structured cash transactions with
the knowledge of and a purpose to
evade the bank's reporting obliga-
tion. Id. at 659. The Court stated
that "[t]he trial judge in Ratzlaf's
case, with the Ninth Circuit's ap-
probation, treated § 5322(a)'s
"willfulness" requirement essen-
tially as surplusage-as words of
no consequence." Id.
The Court noted that to ascer-
tain the correct meaning of "will-
ful," it must be understood within
its statutory context. The Court
stated that the court of appeals
previously interpreted the "will-
fulness" requirement as mandat-
ing both "knowledge of the report-
ing requirement and a specific in-
tent to commit the crime, i.e., a
purpose to disobey the law." Id.
(citations omitted). The Court
concluded that to apply a different
meaning for each code section to a
term which appears throughout a
statutory text "would open
Pandora's jar." Id. at 660 (quot-
ing United States v. Aversa, 948
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F.2d 493, 498 (1st Cir. 1993)(en
banc)).
The Court further rejected the
government's contention that the
"willfulness" requirement of §
5322(a) was satisfied by the dem-
onstration that the defendant per-
formed the prohibited conduct of §
5324. 1d. The government argued
that specific intent to do wrong can
be inferred from the commission of
the prohibited activity due to its
illicit purpose as stated in the stat-
ute. The government concluded
that an individual structures cur-
rency transactions for the unlawful
purpose of evading the statutory
reporting obligations. In response,
the Court stated that "currency
structuring is not inevitably nefari-
ous[,]" and therefore, an additional
showing of "willfulness" to en-
gage in the prohibited activity for
the illicit purpose is necessary. Id.
at 661. Moreover, the Court noted
examples of innocent circumstances
in which an individual would vio-
late the reporting statute under the
government's definition, such as
when a small business entrepre-
neur makes cash deposits twice a
week in the amounts of $9,500.00,
rather than once a week in the
amount of $19,000.00, which
would triggerthe reporting statute.
Id. According to the Court, the
activity of such an individual was
not the evil intended to be pre-
vented by the statute. The small
businessperson may have made
small cash deposits for the sole
purpose of minimizing the risk of
burglary, or for some other benign
purpose. Id. As a result, the Court
found that the "willfulness" re-
quirement imposed upon the gov-
ernment the burden of showing that
the defendant acted with knowl-
edge of his unlawful conduct. Id. at
662. The Court declined to con-
sider the legislative history of the
statute, since it found the statutory
language to be unambiguous. Id. at
662-663.
The Court concluded by stating
that it upheld the principle that
ignorance of the law is no defense
to a criminal charge, unless other-
wise legislated by Congress. Id. at
663. The Court found that Con-
gress legislated to that effect in 31
U.S.C. § 5322(a). As a result,
Ratzlaf's conviction was over-
turned, because the jury was not
instructed to determine whether or
not Ratzlaf knew that the structur-
ing in which he was engaged was
illegal. Id.
In his dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Blackmun, with whom the
Chief Justice, Justice O'Connor,
and Justice Thomasjoined, rejected
the majority's construction of §§
5322(a) and 5324(3). Rejecting
the majority's interpretation of
"willful," Justice Blackmun stated
that in a criminal law context,
"willfully" is generally understood
to refer to "'consciousness of the
act but not to consciousness that
the act is unlawful."' Id. at 664
(quoting Cheek v. United States,
498 U.S. 192,209 (1991)). Justice
Blackmun, therefore, concluded
that in order for a willful violation
of § 5324 to occur, the government
must only prove the defendant's
knowledge of the financial
institution's reporting obligation
and that the defendant structured
currency transactions for the pur-
pose of avoiding those require-
ments. Id. at 665. Justice Blackmun
found no basis in § 5324 to impose
an "artificially heightened scienter
requirement" and that the
majority's imposition of one "as a
practical matter largely nullifies
the effect of that provision." Id. at
665, 669.
The Ratzlaf decision is signifi-
cant in that the Supreme Court
resolved the confusion surround-
ing the statutory interpretation of
the "willfulness" requirement in
the Bank Secrecy Act. The Court
required the government to inde-
pendently establish the defendant's
knowledge of his criminal actions
as separate and distinct from the
criminal act itself. The Court
breathed new life into the criminal
defense of ignorance of the law. By
giving effect to the words "will-
fully violating" in § 5322(a), the
Court insured that only those de-
fendants who had the specific in-
tent to circumvent the reporting
duty of financial institutions and
who acted with the knowledge that
structuring currency transactions
was unlawful will be convicted.
- Amy Conrad
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